How much strength did the Prime Minister’s visit to China add to foreign policy?

The visits of the Prime Minister of Bangladesh to China and India have always attracted special attention in South Asia. Both visits also carry political significance beyond the diplomatic sphere. There is great expectation surrounding the visit; after the visit, the calculation of demands and benefits begins. The same is happening before and after Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s visit. The investigation is ongoing about what Bangladesh is going to get from this visit. The Prime Minister may also visit India soon. The observation reports of the China visit will also start being compared with that possible visit. We have seen this in the past.

The public calculates the gains in economic and defence matters from any visit by the Prime Minister of Bangladesh to China. Similarly they want to see a message of sharing the water of the common rivers and peace on the border from the visit to India.

In an official briefing, the Prime Minister’s Adviser Mahadi Amin called the visit to China historic. He announced the signing of 17 memorandums of understanding. The details of the joint declaration available on the website of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs also contain mention of the memorandums of understanding.

The 15-article declaration states that both countries have agreed to build a comprehensive strategic partnership. To this end, regular dialogue will be held in the 2+2 model. That is, the foreign ministers and defence ministers of both countries will take part in the discussions. This also means that the military relations of both countries will be important.

Notably, the fourth article of the joint declaration states that Bangladesh has reaffirmed its firm commitment to the one China policy and recognised Taiwan as an integral part of China. It has specifically opposed any form of independence for Taiwan and supported China’s reunification initiative.

The presence of a separate clause regarding Taiwan makes it clear that both sides want to move out of the position that the BNP took on the Taiwan issue in the past and the misunderstanding that resulted with China. It was also stated that China will assist Bangladesh in becoming a partner of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in the international arena.

Only two issues have been clearly stated in the economic sphere; both countries will work on the modernisation and expansion of Mongla Port and China will build a special economic zone in Chattogram. The word expansion in the Mongla Port issue is important in the sense that China can build an economic zone here too. It was once supposed to be an Indian economic zone.

During this visit, there was also discussion of exploring the issue of direct land connectivity between China and Bangladesh. Many media outlets have referred to it as a corridor; in reality, it is about direct connectivity. Corridor and land connectivity are separate issues. Myanmar will be the corridor in the Bangladesh-China connectivity.

In Article 13 of the joint declaration, China said it would provide maximum assistance to the best of its ability for the return of the ‘Rohingy’a. However, instead of the word Rohingya, the phrase ‘forced displaced people’ was used. This once again makes it clear that China still supports the ethnic position of the Bamars on the Rohingya issue.

Notably, the joint declaration contains little significant new information on investment. There is also little on defence or military matters. However, defence assistance or purchases are often not made visible.

China has agreed to assess the feasibility of the long-cherished infrastructure plan on the Bangladesh side of the Teesta River and to assist in related work. The speculation of a possible agreement on the much-discussed project has not materialised.

Teesta has become a sensitive issue for Bangladesh. Sheikh Hasina’s government has not been able to get its share of water despite almost a decade and a half of discussions. It is also indecisive about alternative infrastructure solutions. The current government also seems to be moving forward with a slow-motion policy on this issue. The Prime Minister may want to understand New Delhi’s latest stance on this issue during his visit to India. China is not seeking third-party participation in this potential project. Again, Bangladesh seems reluctant to move forward with the project right now if India objects.

However, there are two paragraphs of the joint declaration that hold great potential. One is assistance in water resources management. Although the Teesta project has been the main focus of news reports, the interest that China has expressed in flood and water resources management cooperation could be useful for Bangladesh.

Whether or not there is an agreement with India on Transboundary Rivers, the possibility of getting the required water in the future is low. So many dam and barrage projects are being built upstream of these rivers that the uninterrupted flow of water like in the past may never be achieved again. This is a harsh reality.

Consequently, Bangladesh now needs to pay more attention to water management in addition to the water dispute. Since we have a good rainy season and an extensive network of rivers, using Chinese knowledge, Bangladesh can start a new chapter in environmentally friendly solutions to water problems. To move forward in this regard, Bangladesh will have to enter the era of comprehensive water management. For that, it is also necessary to increase administrative and engineering skills around water resources. China may have thrown that challenge in front of the Tarique Rahman government.

Bangladesh can take forward the proposal of direct connectivity that China has made. Such a connection will not be more expensive and time-consuming. China is on the way to connecting to Arakan through Myanmar. Again, Bangladesh has also built some infrastructure for a similar purpose in the Chattogram-Cox’s Bazar section. Now is the time to show political capacity to take the matter forward. If Bangladesh joins such a territorial connection, it will be able to connect with the economies of ASEAN countries as well as China.

The economic part of Bangladesh’s relations with India has not progressed much in the last 55 years. The possibility of increasing economic investment in Bangladesh from India is slim. It is now urgent for Bangladesh to turn to China and ASEAN for both needs. India has also been moving forward with the Look East policy for a long time.

China and India are trying to increase economic cooperation in various areas, including BRICS. Bangladesh can try to include them in the discussed connectivity proposal. The task is certainly challenging diplomatically. But what is the harm in trying! Ziaur Rahman succeeded in forming SAARC that was also challenging at that time. Although the door to such multilateral possibilities was not opened, China’s proposal for direct connectivity gave Tarique Rahman a big capital for his visit to India. It silently strengthened his hand in negotiations on many issues. However, Dhaka should view China’s proposal for direct connectivity positively, not only as a diplomatic bargaining tool, but in any situation. It may also help solve the Rohingya problem.

Writer: Altaf Parvez is a researcher on the history of South Asia

The article was originally published in the print and online editions of The Daily Samakal and has been rewritten for the English version by Mohammed Humayun Kabir, Assistant News Editor