Myanmar’s ‘new’ president and Bangladesh’s old responsibilities

Myanmar’s military leader Min Aung Hlaing has now taken office as the country’s civilian president. There is no doubt that he was chosen through a secret ballot in the first session of the country’s federal legislature, known as the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. He received 429 votes out of a total of 664 in the two houses of the legislature – the Amyotha Hluttaw or House of Nationalities and the Pyithu Hluttaw or People’s Assembly. 

However, this election was only a formality. In reality, Min Aung Hlaing had been plotting to become the elected president ever since the military overthrew Aung San Suu Kyi’s elected government in a coup.

In February 2021, the National League for Democracy (NLD) government led by Suu Kyi had completed one term. It had won a large majority in the election and was preparing for another term. At that time, General Hlaing staged a military coup. In his address to the nation seven days later, he promised that power would be handed over to a civilian government through fresh elections within one year. That one year has now stretched into five years.

During this period, General Hlaing has imprisoned or exiled most of the possible leaders and activists of the NLD. He has also suppressed all kinds of protests and rebellions against the junta with a firm and brutal approach. Within the army, he has promoted generals who are completely loyal to him. For example, the general he appointed as the new army chief after stepping down to become president, Ye Win Oo, has long been one of General Hlaing’s most trusted allies.

According to Myanmar’s 2008 constitution, 25 percent of the seats in both houses of the legislature are reserved for the armed forces, known as the Tatmadaw. One of the two vice presidents, as well as the ministers of defence, border affairs, and home affairs, must also come from the military. Despite these built-in advantages, General Hlaing took five years to hold elections. His main aim was to send several senior or contemporary generals into retirement. Although the leader of the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party and former general Khin Yi Win, who won the majority in this election, was expected to become president, he was instead given the position of Speaker. Previous military leaders such as Shwe Mann and Than Shwe had chosen not to take the presidency even though they held all the power. General Hlaing has now broken that tradition.

The final step was the election itself, which was more of a ceremony. This was not easy to organise. Since the military coup, not only peaceful protests but also armed resistance has spread across many states and regions of the country. The larger administrative areas mainly inhabited by the country’s largest ethnic group, the Bamar, are called regions. The areas mainly inhabited by other ethnic groups are called states. These include Kachin State, Shan State, Kayah State, Kayin State, Mon State, Chin State, and Rakhine State, as well as the Sagaing Region, Mandalay Region, Magway Region, Bago Region, Ayeyarwady Region, Yangon Region, and Tanintharyi Region. Each region and state has 12 seats in the National Assembly, with a total of 168 elected seats plus 56 seats for the military.

Seats in the People’s Assembly are based on townships, which are similar to the former subdivisions in Bangladesh. There are 330 elected seats plus 110 seats for the military. Since 2022, armed resistance has spread so widely that the junta has had to carry out military operations in 315 townships. For instance, Rakhine State, which lies across the Naf River from Bangladesh, has 17 townships in total. For the past year, 14 of these have been under the control of the rebel Arakan Army.

In Rakhine State, only three townships remain under the control of the military junta: the state capital Sittwe (formerly known as Akyab), the nearby peninsula of Kyaukphyu, and the island of Manaung. In the election for the People’s Assembly, the Union Solidarity and Development Party won two seats in these areas and the regional political party Rakhine National Party won one. In the National Assembly election, the Union Solidarity and Development Party won two seats and the Arakan Front Party won one. The election results for the whole of Rakhine State were calculated by combining the votes from these few seats with the others. The Arakan League for Democracy, which is closely linked to the influential Arakan Army in Rakhine State, had called for a boycott of the election.

The main point is that through these so-called elections, the military junta in Myanmar has simply put on civilian clothes. In practice, the military’s strong control over the legislative, executive, and judicial branches has only grown stronger. By taking this step, Min Aung Hlaing has personally secured his power in both the military and civilian spheres without any serious challenge. In the words of a Bengali proverb, it can be said that the old rice of the ‘new’ president has only increased.

The real question for Bangladesh is what it can do about this political change in one of its two neighbours. What are Myanmar’s other neighbours doing? It appears that China was among the first to congratulate the new government. Whenever the Myanmar military junta has faced difficulties in recent times, it has received support from both China and Russia, whether in international forums or on the battlefield. Congratulations also came from Belarus. At the time of writing of this article, no congratulatory messages had been seen from other countries, particularly India. 

Meanwhile, Amnesty International has stated that General Hlaing should still be held accountable for the violations of international law and human rights committed by the junta, even after becoming president.

India’s strategy towards Myanmar in recent years has been notable. It has avoided criticising the military junta while also keeping contacts with rebel groups in Rakhine and Chin States. This same strategy cannot easily be followed by Bangladesh. For India, Rakhine and Chin States offer opportunities for trade and access to mineral resources. Bangladesh, however, is facing a major crisis with the repatriation of between 1.4 and 1.5 million Rohingya refugees. Can geopolitical strategies ever treat opportunity and crisis in the same way?

The situation in Rakhine has become particularly difficult for Bangladesh. It is hard to trust the Arakan Army, just as it is hard to trust the military junta. The Arakan Army has often given Bangladesh hopeful words on the Rohingya issue when it needed support. But as soon as it gained strength in Rakhine, it broke those promises. Even Aung San Suu Kyi turned a blind eye not only to Bangladesh but also to her Western supporters on the Rohingya issue. For the past seven and a half decades, the Rohingya people themselves have suffered greatly, losing lives, honour, livelihoods, and futures while dealing with both sides.

In my previous article on Myanmar, I noted that Bangladesh also holds certain advantages from a geopolitical point of view. Bangladesh is the major factor both for Arakan Army and the central government of Myanmar in maintaining control over Rakhine State. This is because Rakhine has no international border except with Bangladesh. Whatever position China, India, or the United States may take on the Rakhine issue, Bangladesh remains the only geographical corridor. (How to deal with the 'desperate' Arakan Army, Daily Samakal, November 9, 2025).

The challenge of dealing with the unpredictable Arakan Army remains important for Bangladesh.

The main point is that Bangladesh must play this geopolitical game carefully and skilfully on a regular basis. There is little value in holding meetings and expressing hope that Rohingya repatriation will begin after upcoming Eid. After the military junta in Myanmar has taken on civilian clothing, a new dimension has been added to the geopolitical reality. Yet the game will continue according to the old rules and policies.

Writer: Sheikh Rokon: Writer and river researcher  

skrokon@gmail.com

The article was originally published in the print and online editions of The Daily Samakal and has been rewritten for the English version by Mohammed Humayun Kabir, Senior Sub-Editor.